Investor Confidence and Oil Wealth in the Guyana-Suriname Basin

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, but PDVSA no longer ranks among the world's top 20 oil companies, its ports and refineries are below standard, and there aren't enough tankers to carry more crude out. Those limits push a full recovery to 3 million barrels a day somewhere between 2032 and 2035, which gives Guyana and Suriname a long head start with the same majors now circling Caracas, along with a short window to build fiscal institutions before the revenue outgrows their economies.

On September 22, we interviewed Dr. Cyril Widdershoven, senior advisor at Bluewater Strategy and a former historian who advises governments, majors, and institutional investors on energy markets and sovereign wealth, about where investor confidence stands across the basin, how much the Essequibo claim still weighs on operators, and what the Netherlands got wrong with its gas money that Georgetown and Paramaribo can still get right.

Full Interview Transcript

Wikistrat Interviewer: Welcome to another Guyana Energy Leadership Institute interview. This episode widens the lens to the whole Guyana-Suriname Basin, because the story we make in Guyana is now a three-country story: Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname, all reacting to the same shock in January, with the removal of Nicolás Maduro and with Washington directly involved in a transition that is still being negotiated.

For the two countries next door, both sitting on some of the most sought-after offshore oil in the world, that changes the math on risk, capital, and competition. To work through what it means for investors and operators in the area, I'm joined by Dr. Cyril Widdershoven, a senior advisor at Bluewater Strategy. He has spent decades analyzing how energy markets, sanctions, offshore risk, and sovereign wealth actually move capital, advising governments, majors, and institutional investors along the way. Cyril, thanks for being here.

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: Thank you.

Wikistrat Interviewer: For years, the Guyana-Suriname Basin was priced partly against Venezuela risk: an unpredictable, sanctioned neighbor with a standing claim on Guyanese territory. With Maduro gone and an interim government in Caracas, has that regional risk premium come down for operators like Exxon and TotalEnergies, or are the majors still treating Venezuela as a source of long-term instability?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: First of all, I think the talk surrounding the area has changed. The changes in Venezuela are now being priced as a little bit more positive, so the investment risk that people are looking at has changed from extremely negative to more optimistic than at the beginning of 2026. However, keep in mind that investors, IOCs, NOCs, banks, et cetera, are still keeping a wary eye on what is now going on in Venezuela. How stable is it? What are the issues they need to deal with? And what is the role of the US going to be in the next year, or the next few years?

At the same time, they are still a little bit wary of Venezuela and Guyana, because the official position that Venezuela holds on the border region is still the same. The maps that you see in Venezuela still state that the region currently held by Guyana is considered to be theirs. So yes, optimism is there, but it's cautious. Whenever there are issues coming up in Venezuela, investors, IOCs, and NOCs will keep a wary eye on it. But I think it has not been as optimistic in the last 25 years as it is right now.

Wikistrat Interviewer: With Washington helping restart Venezuela's oil sector, do you expect global capital to rotate back towards Venezuelan oil fields? Or do you think the crude in the Suriname-Guyana Basin is enough to keep investment within the basin rather than flowing back towards the Venezuelan oil fields?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: I think it's an "and-and" story. First of all, the main interest right now, of course, is also linked to the issues in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. So that's what I would say: it's a chance in a lifetime for others to see if they can monetize the reserves they potentially have.

When you then look at the reopening of Venezuela, yes, the interest in Venezuela will have a slightly negative effect on Guyana and Suriname, because there is a huge opportunity. Venezuela was a major producer years ago, and the interest will be there, because the crude quality that Venezuela holds will be of interest for refineries in the US, but maybe also in Europe.

However, I don't think the current interest that I'm seeing in Guyana and in Suriname is gonna wane. Maybe there will be competition, but most of the players that are interested in Guyana and Suriname are the same ones that are playing, or are going to play, a role inside Venezuela. At the same time, crude quality is an issue. Guyana and Suriname have, theoretically, a very interesting, nice crude quality, while Venezuela's is heavy and sour. The interest in both will be there, but it could change depending on, maybe, changes in Russia or changes in the Gulf region. Overall, simply said, looking at where the world is going, I think we will need Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname.

Wikistrat Interviewer: I wanna follow up on that. Realistically, how fast do you think Venezuelan production could come back, given the state of PDVSA and the fields? And what does even a partial recovery do to the competitive position of Venezuela?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: Okay. Since the beginning of 2026, I've seen an overwhelming amount of very optimistic articles, assessments, et cetera, expecting that Venezuela will re-enter the global market extremely quickly at the same level it had. I think that's not realistic. The quickest wins, in 1 or 2 years, could be that, due to maintenance and new technology, we will see another 250,000 to 500,000 barrels a day. But to think that they can reach 3 million barrels a day within the next 1 or 2 years is wishful thinking.

To reach that, I think we are looking at 2032 to 2035, if the other issues are being solved: legal issues, financial issues, political risk issues, sanction issues. Who is gonna do what? What's going to be the position of US entities? What's gonna be the role of Washington? How will the financing be done? And what are we gonna do with all the other non-US-based parties that already have a stake there, like Russia, Iran, whatever? So there are more hiccups to be seen right now than there are reasons to take your Excel sheet and say, "Okay, the first year it's X, and the second year it's X times two." That's not gonna happen.

It's very simple. Venezuelan crude is not Murban or Brent or whatever; it's another type of crude. The refineries are, let's say, not up to standards. PDVSA was a major force, but at this moment, I would not rank it in the top 20. Logistics is a major issue. The ports are way below the standards and the capacity they should have, and it's also not realistic to expect that there are enough ships available to get the crude out. At this moment, yes, we have a lot of crude in the world, but we do not have enough ships. So more crude means more ships, and that's gonna be an issue.

Wikistrat Interviewer: I know you mentioned the border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela previously, so I wanted to touch back on that. Guyana has taken the position that the final ICJ ruling is what should be the case, but a court decision only holds if the other party respects it. So does an interim government focused on economic recovery have an incentive to drop a claim that has been very useful for every Venezuelan government? And what does continued uncertainty mean for operators drilling near the disputed maritime zone?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: If I were the interim Venezuelan government, I would not even mention the ongoing dispute, for several reasons. First of all, you do not need it at this moment: focus on what is needed for the existing mature fields that you have. Second, any remark or any indication in the media or in politics will be a reason for investors in Venezuela and elsewhere to say, "Hey, we need to watch out." Third, why stir up a hornets' nest when you need stability? Without political, economic, financial, and legal stability, investors will not come, because there are enough opportunities elsewhere.

And also keep in mind that the private companies that are working in or looking at Guyana and Suriname are the same ones that are looking at Venezuela. Stability is needed for all of them. It would maybe be an understandable internal Venezuelan political statement, but it will be a boomerang, because investors, operators, shippers, whatever, will say, "Okay, let's wait. Let's put our money, our operations, our engineers, whatever, somewhere else."

Wikistrat Interviewer: That's interesting. If Venezuela gets its oil production up to the standards it needs to be at, do you think this claim, this dispute, will recur?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: Okay. As a former historian, I know that people, especially politicians, never learn from history. So there will always be a possibility that certain political views come back. Look at China, or the Falklands: not functional, not rational, but sometimes when elections are coming up or positions are under pressure, it would be an option.

Wikistrat Interviewer: That's a great point, and I tend to agree with you there. I think it's long-rooted, so I think it'll be present in the future.

Regarding Venezuela, I wanna talk about resource governance and wealth management across the region. Venezuela had the largest reserves in the hemisphere and still hollowed itself out. Guyana has its Natural Resource Fund, and Suriname has its Savings and Stabilization Fund and new fiscal rules from 2024. Money's arriving faster than institutions usually mature, so what actually separates a country that manages this well from one that doesn't manage it as well?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: The main issue is always, and of course as someone from the Netherlands, we've had this issue, that when a country suddenly gets a revenue base that it did not expect to have, and the income very quickly becomes extremely big, too big to be handled by the economy of that country, then you get inflation, et cetera.

What Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname need to watch out for is to understand that most of them have very small populations. Their economy is not extremely large, their infrastructure is not there, and their industry is also not there. So to invest every single US dollar they earn from oil or oil products directly into an economy that is not able to absorb it will be dysfunctional. They need to learn from the experiences and lessons of the Dutch, the Norwegians, maybe even the Arabs, like the UAE, Abu Dhabi, or Saudi Arabia, and see how they can mitigate the negative impact of receiving an unexpected, immense amount of money.

At the same time, don't use your Excel sheet again, because oil prices fluctuate. They are now at 105, 107. They could easily go higher. They could stabilize around 80, but they could also go back to 8. So how do you mitigate these fluctuations when you set up an economic investment strategy? The most prudent way to do this is to say, "I will invest X percent of my revenue, and the rest I will put in a sovereign wealth fund or an oil fund, or however you want to call it, and make that a long-term, 25-year-plus investment strategy in which the revenues from that fund are gonna be used, not the fund itself."

So do not do what the Dutch did. We found natural gas, and we built bridges, roads, social security, schooling, whatever. The money was there, and we are now confronted by the fact that, yes, there is still gas, but we are not gonna produce it anymore, so that income is gone. So there is a gap between what we thought the revenues would be and what the revenues are in reality. With oil, it's the same. If you do not put a baseline price on your revenues, let's say $40 per barrel, and you put it at 80 and think that's gonna hold for the next 25 years, you are heading for an economic situation that is not the most...

Wikistrat Interviewer: I want to close out with a wide-view question for you. What is one lesson from Venezuela that Georgetown and Paramaribo still haven't taken seriously enough?

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: That you need to make sure from the start that you set up an economic and financial system that is workable for the next 25 to 50 years. That includes setting up your education, your workforce, your infrastructure, and your international relations, to make sure that what you are planning to do, producing oil and gas, is gonna be functional and sustainable. But it also means making sure from the start that you use whatever you want to use to diversify your economy. You need to understand, and I am a totally pro-oil and gas person, that oil and gas is a finite resource. There will be a time when the income will go down and will not even exist anymore. So prepare yourself for the time after, and set up an economic and educational system that makes that feasible.

Wikistrat Interviewer: Cyril, thank you. This has been a very clarifying episode, and the market-eye view you've given us is hard to get, so I really appreciate you joining us. Thank you.

Dr. Cyril Widdershoven: Thank you.