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GELI/AN/2026/02

Redrawing the Americas: What Washington’s Hemispheric Push Means for Guyana

In this GELI expert interview, geopolitical analyst Stephanie Henaro discusses how Washington's "Greater North America" framework is reshaping the Americas, from China's and Russia's shrinking footholds to Brazil's election, and why Guyana should make itself indispensable in new supply chains.

GELI Research Team13 min read

As globalization gives way to regional blocs, the United States is reorganizing the Americas around energy, water, critical minerals, and supply chains, and Guyana, one of the world's fastest-growing oil producers, sits squarely inside that plan.

On September 15, we interviewed Mexican geopolitical analyst Stephanie Henaro, who specializes in great-power competition, organized crime, and energy security in Latin America, to assess how Washington's "Greater North America" framework is reshaping the region, from China's and Russia's shrinking footholds in Venezuela and Brazil's October election to the oil, water, and critical minerals that make Guyana a strategic prize, and how small states can make themselves indispensable in the supply chains now being built.

Full Interview Transcript

Wikistrat Interviewer: Welcome to another Guyana Energy Leadership Institute expert interview. Today, we're stepping back to look at the bigger picture: how the removal of Nicolás Maduro and a US-backed transition in Caracas are redrawing the balance of power across the Americas, from Brasília to Bogotá to Washington, and what it all means for Guyana as the region's newest strategic prize.

To help us map it, I'm joined by Stephanie Hanaro, a geopolitical analyst whose work focuses on great power competition, hemispheric strategy, and Latin America's place in a shifting global order, with a sharp eye on how decisions in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow land across the region. Stephanie, thanks for being here.

Stephanie Henaro: Thanks for having me. I'm really excited to be here.

Wikistrat Interviewer: My first question for you is: the capture of Maduro and a US-backed transition in Caracas was the most direct US intervention in the region in a generation, and some are reading it as a revival of the Monroe Doctrine for the 21st century. Do you see this as a one-off or the opening move in a broader reassertion of US primacy across the Americas?

Stephanie Henaro: It definitely was a big message, not only for the world but for the whole region itself, because it meant that the Monroe Doctrine was back, but with a little bit of Donald Trump on it, because now we talk about the Trump Doctrine. And it's kind of different with the Monroe, because the Monroe meant no foreign power was allowed to land in the American continent. Now the US wants to stop that strategic dependence on the continent, especially on China and a little bit of Russia as well.

Wikistrat Interviewer: So, does a more interventionist Washington strengthen smaller states like Guyana that depend on US backing, or does it unsettle them by making the region more contested?

Stephanie Henaro: I think it gives calm to little states like Guyana, because the US pretty much now controls Venezuela, who had territorial claims with Guyana. But now, since there are a lot of US oil companies there, like Exxon, for example. Venezuela knows that if it does something against Guyana, it will do something against US interests.

And to make a point regarding that, I want to highlight that once the Maduro intervention passed, Marco Rubio spoke to Guyana's foreign minister just to make sure they will cooperate in security. So that was a really strong message for the region.

Wikistrat Interviewer: How do you view his interventionist attitude in Washington? How do you think other capitals in other countries are reading this, in the region and then also for themselves?

Stephanie Henaro: It all has to do with the new US framework that started being published this year. It started with a new US defense strategy. Then it started again with the US security strategy, because it mentioned that the US was protecting a new security perimeter in the American continent that went from Northern Ecuador to Greenland, and then that it would also secure natural resources and strategic geographical points, like choke points.

And then in March this year, Pete Hegseth named it Greater North America. So that is the framework with which the US sees the whole region. But the point here is that not every single country is aware of what's going on. I was looking at regional reactions when Pete Hegseth named the Greater North America and showed this map, putting all the countries involving that strategy in the same color, like if we were part of the same country.

Wikistrat Interviewer: On the interventionist attitude towards Venezuela: looking at who was there previously, China and Russia had very deep footholds there, specifically through oil, arms, and money. With Maduro gone and Washington kind of steering the transition, what happens to all those foreign investments, specifically with Beijing and Moscow, and their wider position within Latin America?

Stephanie Henaro: They're being left behind because of the new oil agreement that gives the US control of 22% of Venezuela's oil reserve for the next 100 years. They're pretty much being left behind because [the US has] control of the major oil deposits now.

And when it comes to other countries, for example Guyana, you have Exxon, you have Chevron, but you also have the Chinese giant CNOOC. And with time, I'm pretty sure they're gonna have to leave the region, because with this, what the US is trying to build is a new frame for energy security that is based on the region. Globalization is pretty much over after the pandemic, so the three main global powers are splitting the world into three pieces, as if the world were a piece of cake. And the US is stepping up for this part of the world, and it's easier to get oil going from Venezuela to the US than from Hormuz to the US.

Wikistrat Interviewer:  The US kind of maintains oil control in Venezuela. Do you see Moscow and Beijing looking towards other oil-rich countries? You mentioned that in Guyana, China has a stake, but do you think they're gonna expand their view towards other options?

Stephanie Henaro: Yes, especially when it comes to the regions: Russia is gonna be mainly focused in Eurasia, and China is gonna be focused towards the South China Sea, where they're gonna build new supply chains.

Wikistrat Interviewer: And now onto Brazil. Brazil borders both Venezuela and Guyana, and it kind of sees itself as the natural arbiter of South American affairs. How is Brazil positioning itself in this new environment? And can it stay a counterweight to Washington while at the same time protecting its own interests on both frontiers?

Stephanie Henaro: The case of Brazil is really interesting, because Brazil is having presidential elections in October, and that result is not going to have an effect only on Brazil. It will also have an effect on regional boundaries, because it will set up the boundary of Greater North America, or the boundary of the alliance. Right now, Lula is up in the polls, but some polls are putting Bolsonaro really close, and some others even say he might win in the second round.

If Bolsonaro wins, this might prove really interesting for the US, because it has plans to make a major oil alliance with Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Venezuela, and Guyana. So you have five major oil producers that have everything it takes to practically get rid of OPEC. Even if the natural oil reserves in this part of the world aren't enough to surpass the Middle East, there will be enough for the region to be self-sufficient.

Wikistrat Interviewer: I'm glad you brought up the election. We know that Lula has kind of opposed US intervention. How does Brazil reconcile that stance with the stability of a post-Maduro Venezuela, and the stability that Venezuela could now bring to its northern border?

Stephanie Henaro: It's interesting, because Lula has a left-wing ideology, and Venezuela was kind of the cradle of left-wing ideology with Chávez and then with Maduro. Now that they're gone, left-wing governments are being surpassed by right-wing governments, especially in elections, and countries such as Brazil or Mexico are being isolated. In the case of Brazil, Lula has been linked to major corruption scandals.

Right now, they don't have a good perception of him or the left. Insecurity is also rising in Brazil, so Bolsonaro is promising security and to be closer to the US, and this is kind of winning the region. And this is something I really want to point out, because security seems to be the new ideology in the region. It's not about left or right anymore.

Wikistrat Interviewer: I'm glad you brought that up. Do you think this rise of security ideology is a more modern thing, or do you think it came after the Maduro ousting?

Stephanie Henaro: I think it was already going up before the Maduro ousting. I think it all started with Bukele in El Salvador being successful when it comes to stopping violence, but a real disaster when it comes to human rights. Still, most countries are sick and tired of drug cartel-related violence, and they want peace and stability, so they're thinking about it.

Wikistrat Interviewer: That's a great point. More on Venezuela: Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, and Guyana has become one of the fastest-growing producers on Earth. With both now in play, how are strategic resources redrawing the map of power in that hemisphere, and who gains that advantage?

Stephanie Henaro: The US, because it's leading this new hemispheric reconfiguration. But it's not only about oil. As I mentioned before, if we put oil reserves from Venezuela, Canada, and the US together, you get pretty much 30% of global oil reserves.

But you also have to take into account natural water, because we need natural water not only to have something to drink; we need it in order to be able to produce food. So when it comes to food security, it's really important to take into account that we have the largest natural water reserves in the Great Lakes zone between the US and Canada, but also in the south of the continent, in the basins of the Orinoco and Magdalena rivers, which are in Venezuela and Colombia.

We also have very large reserves, and if we put them together, we will have around 38% of global drinkable water supplies. This is important because if you compare this to what the European Union has, they only have 7%. So that will give us a larger advantage, not only to produce food but also to be interconnected, because the Caribbean does not have the same harvesting cycles that North America has, so it will be complementary.

Wikistrat Interviewer: I'm glad you brought up resources outside of oil. How do critical minerals and the Amazon's resources factor into this contest over the region? You touched on that a bit, but I'd like to hear more.

Stephanie Henaro: That's interesting, because in this part of the world, we have lithium: the US, Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia all have lithium. But we also have copper, silicon, and other critical minerals that are required for high technology nowadays. But we do not have the technology that it takes to transform those minerals into technology, so in that area we still need China, and that's our weak point. So right now, what we need to focus on is developing that kind of technology.

Wikistrat Interviewer: Interesting. With China kind of on the outs regarding Venezuela, do you think that could be a point for them to reenter the supply chain here and the region?

Stephanie Henaro: I think it might, especially when we look at countries like Peru. Peru is a really interesting case, because Keiko Fujimori just won the presidency, and she's ideologically closer to Donald Trump than the former president. But China has become Peru's largest trading partner, and it buys almost a third of its copper exports.

Now they are developing a port in Peru, the Chancay Port, which connects China to South America. What's ironic about this is that when Peru wanted to develop that port, they asked the US for investment and got no response. Then they asked Europe, but they got no response. And then they asked China, and China said yes.

Now Marco Rubio just visited the country, because he's really concerned about China having a foothold in Peru, and that's a reality. It doesn't matter how ideologically close you might be; the economy always sets the rhythm.

Wikistrat Interviewer: That's a great point. To bring it back to Latin America and regional agency: you've written about a hemisphere being redrawn, and about Latin American states often being cast as pieces on someone's chessboard rather than as individual players themselves. In this reconfiguration, does the region gain agency or lose it? Who speaks for Latin America now?

Stephanie Henaro: That's a very good question. A few years ago, I would've just said Mexico, because Mexico used to be a regional leader. Then Brazil took its place, but nobody has this closeness to Brazil or Mexico anymore. So the region is kind of divided between the countries that see the US as a threat and the countries that see it as a security partner.

In that sense, you can see Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, even Chile and Argentina coming together, and you can see countries like Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Nicaragua being isolated. So we don't have a single voice anymore.

Wikistrat Interviewer: Going off that, do you think a coherent Latin American bloc is realistic in this environment? I know you just mentioned how they're fragmenting, and you can see that happening. Do you think they'll fragment among themselves, or will there be an overarching great power within the bloc that's helping them out?

Stephanie Henaro: It all depends on how the economy turns out, because right now, with the exception of Guyana, nobody's really growing in the region. Foreign direct investment within the countries of the region is diminishing, and that's a problem with Latin America. Foreign investments are strong when they come from outside, but within the region, they're tiny. So that reflects the kind of connection we have within the region.

But when it comes to leadership, I think we might have three different kinds. I think Paraguay might have a strong voice in the South. For Central America, I think Mexico still has it. But when it comes to the Caribbean, I think what's going on with Trinidad and Tobago is really interesting. The Caribbean, especially countries that belong to CARICOM, used to define itself as a zone of peace, and now the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago is saying that they have to accept that there's no peace in the region and that they have to come closer to the US.

Wikistrat Interviewer: Interesting. I'm glad you brought up the Caribbean. Looking out over the next 5 to 10 years, how do you expect this balance of power across the Americas to settle? And is this a moment in the region where the future is getting decided, or is it more of a moment where it's getting contested?

Stephanie Henaro: It all depends on whether countries realize that this is a moment when they have to turn their geography into power, because if you don't do that, then someone else is gonna write the rules. It has happened before. What's going on right now is not going to go anywhere, even if the Democrats win the next presidential election, because this is a global response to the end of globalization.

Globalization's gone; regionalization is here to stay, and I think the only thing left to be decided is what part of that regionalization you want to be. Right now we have a really good example in what's going on in Arizona. The US is trying to end its dependence on Chinese technology and to build new semiconductor factories in Arizona.

And 15 days ago, Mexico's foreign minister went to visit Arizona State University, because they wanted to be a part of that. But the question here is whether Mexico is only going to provide the boxes for the product or whether it's going to develop a part of that technology, because either answer changes future possibilities. That could be the case for every single country in this new geopolitical doctrine that the US is leading, because there are 33 countries involved in the Greater North America doctrine.

Wikistrat Interviewer: If you were advising a small or mid-sized Latin American state right now, what posture would you recommend taking, considering the environment and everything going on?

Stephanie Henaro: Right now, security can be translated into stopping dependencies outside of the region. So I would look at the world and say, "Okay, what dependency is the US going to cut out from the rest of the world?" And I would explore whether I can cover it, so I can become indispensable and have a greater weight in decision-making in that new regionalization.

Wikistrat Interviewer: So basically position yourself in somewhere where you will be needed down the line and you can provide a benefit to a larger power.

Stephanie Henaro: Exactly. The new frontier is going to be settled in supply chains.

Wikistrat Interviewer: Stephanie, thank you. This is one of those moments where the story's obviously still being written, and having someone who can read the whole board makes it a lot clearer. So thank you for helping us think through what's ahead for Venezuela, for Guyana, and for the region.

To our listeners, thanks for joining us. We'll keep tracking how this unfolds in future episodes of the Guyana Energy Leadership Institute expert interviews. Until next time.

Stephanie Henaro: Thank you.



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